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By JENNIFER FINK*
THROUGHOUT THE PAST several decades there has been exten-
sive litigation surrounding the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and the protection it affords the American public.
The Fourth Amendment states:
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.'
The primary purpose of this Amendment is to "[p]rotect[ ] citi-
zens from unwarranted governmental intrusion."2 In order to protect
citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures and limit the po-
tentially abusive power of the police, the Fourth Amendment requires
police to have a search warrant 3 based on probable cause 4 in order to
perform a lawful search and seizure.5
* Class of 2001. The author would like to dedicate this Note to her family for their
love and support.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 941 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
3. A search warrant is defined as "[a]n order in writing, issued by a justice or other
magistrate, in the name of the state, directed to a sheriff, constable, or other officer, au-
thorizing him to search for and seize any property that constitutes evidence of the commis-
sion of a crime, contraband ...or things otherwise criminally possessed." BLACK'S LAw
DICT7IONARY 1350 (6th ed. 1991).
4. Probable cause is defined as:
The evidentiary criterion necessary to sustain ... the issuance of an arrest or
search warrant. "Probable cause" ... exists where facts and circumstances within
officers' knowledge ... are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reason-
able caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed; it is not
necessary that the officer possess knowledge of facts sufficient to establish guilt,
but more than mere suspicion is required.
BLACK'S LAW DIrIIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1991).
5. See Ray, 981 P.2d at 931.
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Courts have been confronted with a multitude of circumstances
under which defendants have claimed violations of their Fourth
Amendment rights. Courts have responded by interpreting the Fourth
Amendment, and the degree of protection it affords, in light of the
particular facts and circumstances presented.6 Over time, courts have
carved out a careful set of exceptions to the warrant and probable
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.7 The situations where
police are not required to secure a warrant include so-called "exigent
circumstances,"8 searches incident to arrest,9 seizures of items in plain
view,"' and consent searches. 1
The need to protect the sanctity of an individual's home is a com-
mon theme running through Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 12
The United States Supreme Court has held that "'the physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed.'"" 3 Absent exceptional circumstances, courts
have steadfastly adhered to the warrant and probable cause require-
ments in deciding the constitutionality of searches of private resi-
dences.1 4 "Entry into a residence by a police officer is 'Per se'
unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a
6. SeeJohn F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth Amendment
Restrictions, 89J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433, 436-40 (1999).
7. See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
8. See People v. Duncan, 720 P.2d 2, 11 (Cal. 1986)) (defining exigent circumstances
as "an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or
serious damage to property"); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966)
(holding that a warrant is not required in a situation where the procurement of a warrant
would result in the destruction of evidence as long as the police did not create the need for
an immediate response).
9. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that when a law
enforcement official effects a valid arrest, he or she may perform a search of the individual
arrested, including the area immediately surrounding the arrestee).
10. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 142 (1990) (holding that when a law
enforcement official is at a particular location lawfully and he or she views contraband or
other evidence of criminal activity, the officer may seize the evidence without first ob-
taining a warrant).
11. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-28, 248 (1973) (holding
that if a law enforcement official obtains voluntary consent to search a premises from an
individual with apparent authority to give consent, the officer may search without first
obtaining a warrant).
12. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (citing Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
13. Id. (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972)).
14. See id.
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carefully defined set of exceptions.' 5 Consequently, when a case in-
volving the search and seizure of an individual's home comes before a
court, the sitting judges must be particularly cautious to ensure there
was either a valid warrant or an applicable exception to the warrant
requirement.
The community caretaking exception is the most recent excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 16 This excep-
tion allows police to enter an individual's home without a warrant
when they are concerned for the welfare of the occupants and the
property within. 17 The essence of this exception lies in the fact that
certain activities of law enforcement officials are "totally divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating
to the violation of a criminal statute."18 It encompasses situations
where police officers are "helping stranded motorists, returning lost
children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and protecting citizens in
need."'19 When performing such caretaking functions, law enforce-
ment engages in numerous activities that are beneficial to society at
large. The primary concern of the police in such instances is the well-
being of particular individuals as opposed to crime-solving. 20 Never-
theless, the community caretaking exception threatens the protec-
tions traditionally afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
State courts have begun to recognize the community caretaking
exception. 21 Recently, the exception came before the California Su-
15. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 942 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971)).
16. See id. at 931 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 444 (1973)). The commu-
nity caretaking exception was first recognized in Cady, where the Court held that when
officers arrest an individual in his car, aware of the fact that the arrestee is a police officer
who most likely carries a gun, the police may search the trunk of the vehicle in order to
recover the weapon without first obtaining a warrant. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 447-48. The
Court reasoned that public safety required police officers to perform such functions. See id.
See also discussion infra Part I.A.
17. See People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Mich. 1993).
18. Cady, 413 U.S. at 441.
19. Ray, 981 P.2d at 931.
20. See Davis, 497 N.W.2d at 920.
21. See, e.g., City of Troy v. Ohlinger, 475 N.W.2d 54, 55 (Mich. 1991) (holding that
when officers are pursuing an individual suspected of drunk driving, under the community
caretaking exception the officers may go to his home and enter the dwelling after viewing
the individual bleeding on his bed); Duck v. State, 518 So. 2d 857, 859-60 (Ala. Crim. App.
1987) (holding that when an individual files a missing vehicle complaint and police go to
his trailer in order to get his signature to withdraw it, and upon entering the trailer view
marijuana in plain view, the officers may seize the evidence without a warrant based on
community caretaking functions of police officers).
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preme Court, in People v. Ray,22, which validated -he community care-
taking exception, allowing the police to seize evidence from a home
after making an initial warrantless entry.23
Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of the community care-
taking exception. Part II discusses the majority, concurring, and dis-
senting opinions of the California Supreme Court in Ray. Finally, Part
III analyzes the Ray decision and the problems likely to arise with the
adoption of the community caretaking exception in California. This
Note concludes that the community caretaking exception should be
limited to those situations involving automobiles, leaving the sanctity
of the home intact.
I. Background: The History Behind the Community
Caretaking Exception
A. The Seminal Case of Cady v. Dombrowski
The United States Supreme Court first authorized the commu-
nity caretaking exception in the case of Cady v. Dombrowski.2 4 In Cady,
the police. received a call notifying them that the defendant was in-
volved in a car accident.25 The two officers picked up the defendant at
a local tavern and drove him to the scene of the accident, where his
car was located.26 The defendant informed the officers that he was a
Chicago police officer. 27 Knowing that officers were required to carry
their guns at all times, the police officers searched the defendant's
vehicle in an effort to locate the gun.28 While performing the search,
they discovered and seized evidence linking the defendant to a homi-
cide. 29 At the defendant's trial, the Wisconsin state court admitted this
evidence and the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder,
which conviction was upheld on appeal.30 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's claim that the evidence used against
him at trial was unconstitutionally seized.31 In the defendant's subse-
quent habeas corpus action, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
22. 981 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1999).
23. See id. at 939.
24. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
25. See id. at 435-36.
26. See id. at 436.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 437.
30. See id. at 434.
31. See State v. Dombrowski, 171 N.W.2d 349 (Wis. 1969).
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versed the district court and held that certain evidence at the trial was
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 2
Reversing the Seventh Circuit, the United States Supreme Court
held the evidence was admissible, creating the new community care-
taking exception.33 The court explained that community caretaking
functions of police officers include investigating accidents and recov-
ering missing guns that could be dangerous to the public. 34 The Court
was careful to distinguish, however, between searching automobiles
under this new exception and searching homes without first obtaining
a warrant.3 5 The Court explained: "The constitutional difference be-
tween searches of ... houses . . . from [searches of] vehicles stems
from the ambulatory character of the latter and from the fact [that
there is] extensive, and often noncriminal contact with automo-
biles." 36 This distinction recognized a significantly increased level of
constitutional protection of homes over automobiles and enabled the
Court to rule that the warrantless search involved in Cady was justified
by the community caretaking exception. 37 Therefore, despite the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's expansion of the community caretaking ex-
ception to justify the warrantless searches of homes, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence dictates an increased level of protection
for homes and necessarily requires a more limited application of the
community caretaking exception.
B. Payton v. New York: A Firm Line Against Warrantless Intrusions
into the Home
Courts have acknowledged the sanctity of the home as warranting
the highest level of protection: "At the very core of [the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." 38 In
Payton v. New York, 39 the United States Supreme Court decided a case
in which the defendant challenged a New York statute40 permitting
32. See Dombrowski v. Cady, 471 F.2d 280, 286 (7th Cir. 1972).
33. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 447-48.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 442.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 447-48.
38. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
39. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
40. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.15(4) (McKinney 1992). With respect to an arrest
without a warrant, section 140.15(4) provides: "[A] police officer may enter premises in
which he reasonably believes such person to be present, under the same circumstances and
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law enforcement officials to enter a private residence without a war-
rant in order to make a routine felony arrest.4I After analyzing the
distinction between public and private places, and determining that
private places must be given a much greater degree of protection, 42
the Court concluded the statute was an unconstitutional violation of
the Fourth Amendment. 43 The Court stated: "IT]he Fourth Amend-
ment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exi-
gent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant."44
The Payton case exemplifies the Supreme Court's rejection of
warrantless entries into the sanctity of one's home. The community
caretaking exception adopted by the California Supreme Court in Ray
threatens the right to be free from governmental intrusions into
homes and is likely to have grave and far reaching results.
C. Interpretation of the Community Caretaking Exception By
Courts After Cady
1. United States v. Pichany
In United States v. Pichany,45 the Seventh Circuit was called upon
to determine the validity of a warrantless search performed by police
officers while investigating a burglary. 46 During the investigation of a
neighboring warehouse, the officers entered the defendant's ware-
house and discovered stolen goods.47 The court refused to justify the
officers' actions based on the community caretaking exception cre-
ated in Cady, limiting its application to situations involving
automobiles. 48
The court stated that "the plain import from the language of the
Cady decision is that the Supreme Court did not intend to create a
broad exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to
apply whenever the police are acting in an 'investigative,' rather than
in the same manner as would be authorized . . . if he were attempting to make such an
arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest." Id.
41. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 574.
42. See id. at 587-89.
43. See id. at 603.
44. Id. at 590.
45. 687 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1982).
46. See id. at 205.
47. See id. at 205-06.
48. See id. at 209.
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a 'criminal' function." 49 The court, therefore, explicitly refused to ex-
tend the community caretaking exception beyond the context of auto-
mobiles and suppressed all of the evidence seized at the warehouse
without a warrant and introduced against the defendant. 50 Moreover,
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that "[t]he [Supreme] Court intended
to confine the [Cady] holding to the automobile exception and to
foreclose an expansive construction of the decision allowing warrant-
less searches of private homes or businesses." 51 The Pichany court re-
fused to expand the community caretaking exception at the risk of
jeopardizing the Fourth Amendment safeguard against warrantless
searches.
2. United States v. Erickson
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Er-
ickson,52 also concluded that the Supreme Court in Cady intended to
limit the community caretaking exception to searches of automo-
biles.53 In Erickson, police officers went to the defendant's home to
investigate a burglary. 54 An inspection of the perimeter showed the
house to be secure. 55 Nevertheless, the police proceeded to pull back
a plastic sheet covering a window of the home and found a number of
marijuana plants. 56 The police obtained a search warrant based upon
their discovery of the marijuana plants. 57
The defendant moved to suppress all of the evidence obtained
pursuant to the search warrant, arguing that the initial warrantless
search, which uncovered the marijuana plants in his home, violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. 58 The government argued that the ini-
tial search fell within the community caretaking exception to the war-
rant requirement, because the police were investigating a possible
burglary.59 The district court granted the defendant's suppression
motion. 60
49. Id. at 208-09 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 453 (1973) (Brennan,
J., dissenting)).
50. See id. at 209.
51. Id.
52. 991 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1993).
53. See id. at 532.
54. See id. at 530.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, refusing
to justify the search based on the community caretaking exception. 61
The court noted that Cady "clearly turned on the 'constitutional dif-
ference' between searching a house and searching an automobile." 62
The court explained that this difference required it to limit the appli-
cation of the exception to cases involving automobiles. 63 Thus, the
Erickson court followed Cady and previous Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence by refusing to justify the warrantless search of a home based
solely on the community caretaking exception.
II. The Case: People v. Ray
A. The Parties
In People v. Ray,64 an anonymous caller reported that the doors of
his neighbor's house had been open all day and that it appeared as if
no one was home.65 The police went to investigate and noticed the
door was open approximately two feet. 66 The police stated there was
"clothing, paper, strewn on the ground, on the sofa. It was just a real
mess inside; [it] looked like someone had gone through the house."67
Although the police did not see signs of a forced entry, the messy
condition of the house increased their suspicion that the home might
have been burglarized. 68 One of the officers on the scene stated that
in his experience, "this circumstance correlated to a '95 percent' like-
lihood they had encountered a burglary or similar situation." 69
The police knocked and announced their presence, but no one
responded.70 They did not obtain a warrant to search the premises. 71
Instead, they entered the home of the defendant based on their own
presumptions that the home had been burglarized. 72 The officers con-
ducted a "security check ... to see if anyone inside might be injured,
disabled, or unable to obtain help."73 While inside the premises, they
61. See id.
62. Id. at 532 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973)).
63. See id.
64. 981 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1999).
65. See id. at 931.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 931-32.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 931.
73. Id. at 932.
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did not find anyone, but did "observe a large quantity of suspected
cocaine and money in plain view."' 74 The police left the home in order
to obtain a search warrant based on these observations. 75
The defendant was later charged with possession of more than
twenty-five pounds of cocaine, 76 possession of cocaine base for sale,77
and manufacturing'a controlled substance. 78
B. Procedural Background
1. The Trial Court's Decision
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized,
claiming the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they en-
tered his home without a warrant. 79 The prosecution argued the po-
lice acted within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.80 The trial judge agreed with the defendant and ruled
that the police should have obtained a warrant before entering the
defendant's home and rendered the evidence seized inadmissible. 81
The judge stated that while "we commend the officers for at least do-
ing their community service to try and protect people and help peo-
ple," there was not "sufficient information [that] would justify the
officer to believe that an exigent circumstance was taking place at that
point.' 82 The trial judge went on to state:
It's one of those situations, I think, where it's not uncommon
where people leave their doors open. And we commend the of-
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351 (West 1991). Section 11351 provides:
"[E]very person who possesses for sale or purchases for purposes of sale ... any controlled
substance . . . which is a narcotic drug, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for two, three, or four years." Id. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 113 7 0.4(a)(3) (West 1991). Section 11370.4(a) (3) provides: "Any person convicted of a
violation of, or of a conspiracy to violate, Section 11351 ... [w]here the substance exceeds
25 pounds by weight, . . . shall receive an additional term of 10 years." Id.
77. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11351.5 (West 1991). Section 11351.5 provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in this division, every person who possesses for sale or
purchases for purposes of sale.., any controlled substances [including cocaine base] ...
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years." Id.
78. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11379.6(a) (West 1991). Section 11379.6(a)
provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, every person who manufactures ... either
directly or indirectly by chemical extraction . . . any controlled substance . . . shall be
punished by imprisonment ... for three, five, or seven years and by a fine not exceeding
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)." Id.
79. See Ray, 981 P.2d at 932.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. !d
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ficers for at least doing their community service to try to protect
people and help people. But there are going to be situations where
in fact in doing that they are going to come inside and discover
evidence of a crime. And it's going to turn out unfortunately it is
not admissible. And I think this is one of those situations. 83
Thus, while the trial judge lauded the officer's actions, he did not
think that the exigent circumstances exception, nor any other availa-
ble exception to the warrant requirement, could justify the officers'
search in this instance. In so holding, the judge stated: "[I]f we are
going to get into a situation where you are going to prosecute some-
one for a crime in this situation, I think they need[ ] to get a search
warrant.
'84
2. The Appellate Court's Decision
The appellate court reversed the trial judge's decision, determin-
ing that the actions taken by the police werejustified under the exigent
circumstances exception because "the officers reasonably suspected
that an exigency existed requiring their immediate warrantless en-
try."85 The court balanced the defendant's privacy interests against the
government's interest "in protecting the safety of individuals who may
be the victims of crime or other unfortunate occurrences. '8 6 The
court concluded that, based on the facts before it, the government's
interest prevailed, and the officers were justified in making a warrant-
less entry into the defendant's home.8 7
However, the appellate court failed to set out a clear standard for
law enforcement agents to apply when making such decisions. In-
stead, the court simply stated that the particular factual scenario at
hand affirmed the existence of an "exigency. '8 8 The appellate court
did not discuss the application of the community caretaking excep-
tion, instead basing its decision entirely on the exigent circumstances
exception.89 The defendant appealed to the California Supreme
Court, which granted his petition for review.9 0
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id.
85. People v. Ray, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565, 572 (Ct. App. 1998).
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 932 (Cal. 1999).
90. See People v. Ray, 963 P.2d 1005 (Cal. 1998).
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C. The Case: Proceedings Before the California Supreme Court
1. The Parties' Contentions
In his petition for review to the California Supreme Court, Ray
challenged the appellate court's application of the exigent circum-
stances exception, arguing that the Fourth Amendment prohibits an
officer from performing a warrantless entry into a private residence if
he or she lacks probable cause to believe that an exigency exists.9 1
Because the lower courts focused solely on the exigent circumstances
exception, the defendant's argument did not discuss the community
caretaking exception.
The government argued that the appellate court's decision
should be upheld, contending that the exigent circumstances excep-
tion justified the officers' warrantless entry into Ray's private resi-
dence. 92 The state did not extensively examine the community
caretaking exception, as its brief asserted that the warrantless entry in
this instance could instead be justified on the basis of exigent circum-
stances. 93 The Attorney General argued that the California Supreme
Court should affirm the appellate court "on the basis of the 'emer-
gency aid' exception, which he characterize [d] as a variant of exigent
circumstances. '94
2. The Court's Rationale
a. The Majority Opinion
As stated by the California Supreme Court, " [b] oth the trial court
and the [c]ourt of [aippeal analyzed the facts and law under the exi-
gent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement."95 However, in a divided opinion, the California Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to allow the admission
of the evidence, justifying the officers' actions on the basis of the com-
munity caretaking exception. 96 The California Supreme Court dis-
cussed the appellate court's reasoning, concluding that it misapplied
the exigent circumstances exception.97 The supreme court began its
91. See Petition for Review and Brief In Support Thereof at 2-3, People v. Ray, 981
P.2d 928 (Cal. 1999) (No. S071999).
92. See Respondent's Brief On the Merits at 10-14, People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928 (Cal.
1999) (No. S071999).
93. See id.
94. Ray, 981 P.2d at 932-33.
95. Id. at 932.
96. See id. at 931.
97. See id. at 933.
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analysis with a discussion of the emergency aid exception. 9 The ma-
jority stated that under this exception "police officers 'may enter a
dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to
a person whom they reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of
that assistance.'- 99 Unlike the Attorney General, however, the majority
concluded that the emergency aid doctrine is a subcategory of the
community caretaking exception, not the exigent circumstances
exception. 100
The court distinguished between the exigent circumstances ex-
ception and the community caretaking exception, stating that:
When the police act pursuant to the exigent circumstances excep-
tion, they are searching for evidence or perpetrators of a crime.
Accordingly, in addition to showing the existence of an emergency
leaving no time for a warrant, they must also possess probable
cause that the premises to be searched contains such evidence or
suspects. In contrast, the community caretaker exception is only
invoked when the police are not engaged in crime-solving
activities. I M
The court determined that the exigent circumstances exception
did not apply in this instance because the officers were not engaged in
crime-solving activities.' 0 2 Further, the emergency aid exception was
also inapplicable because such an exception requires a showing of
"specific, articulable facts indicating the need for 'swift action to pre-
vent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property.' "13 In-
stead, the court determined that under the community caretaking
exception, "circumstances short of a perceived emergency may justify
a warrantless entry."1 0 4
The court stated that "under these facts [sic] the officers acted
reasonably to protect the safety and security of persons and property
when they briefly entered the defendant's residence without a warrant
and then observed contraband in plain view." 10 5 The court established
a rule that when officers make a warrantless entry into a dwelling
based on the community caretaking exception, they are authorized to
use their observations of any incriminating evidence that is in plain
view while they are inside the dwelling to form the basis of a subse-
98. See id. at 932-33.
99. Id. at 933 (quoting Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1971)).
100. See id.
101. Id. (quoting People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Mich. 1993)).
102. See id.
103. Id. at 934 (quoting People v. Duncan, 720 P.2d 2, 5 (Cal. 1986)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 939.
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quent search warrant.10 6 Moreover, that evidence is then admissible in
a court of law to prosecute the offender. 10 7
The court relied on People v. Roberts s08 to support its opinion. In
Roberts, officers went to an apartment believed to be occupied by the
defendant, a suspect in a burglary. 10 9 They knocked on the defen-
dant's door, but received no response. 110 The officers claimed that
because they heard "moans or groans" coming from the interior of
the residence, they believed that an occupant might be in distress and
therefore decided to enter without first obtaining a warrant."' The
officers did not find anyone inside the residence, but did find prop-
erty that was taken in the burglary.1 2 The evidence discovered was
used to prosecute the defendant for burglary." 3 The Roberts court up-
held the warrantless search, stating that "the officers reasonably be-
lieved that someone inside the apartment was in distress and in need
of assistance and that they entered for the purpose of giving aid."'"14
The Ray court reasoned that Roberts supported the actions of the of-
ficers in Ray because, like the officers in Roberts, the officers in Ray
entered the premises believing that someone inside might be in
distress. 115
According to the Ray court, under the community caretaking ex-
ception, "[1] ocal police 'should and do regularly respond to requests
of friends and relatives and others for assistance when people are con-
cerned about the health, safety or welfare of their friend, loved ones
and others."'116 The court found State v. Alexander 1 7 "particularly in-
structive" on this point. 18 In Alexander, an anonymous caller reported
that his next door neighbor's basement door was open and he be-
lieved that his neighbor was away."19 The officers knocked and an-
nounced their presence, but received no response. 120 The officers
then proceeded to enter the residence believing a burglary might be
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. 303 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1956).
109. See id. at 722.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 935 (Cal. 1999).
116. Id. at 934 (quoting State v. Bridewell, 759 P.2d 1054, 1060 n.1 (Or. 1988)).
117. 721 A.2d 275 (Md. 1998).
118. Ray, 981 P.2d at 936.
119. See Alexander, 721 A.2d at 277.
120. See id. at 278.
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in progress. 121 The Maryland Supreme Court upheld the warrantless
search on the basis of the community caretaking exception, conclud-
ing that "the police were not pursuing the [defendants] but were at-
tempting to come to their possible aid."'122 The majority in Ray relied
on Alexander to justify the officers' actions under the community care-
taking exception, holding that, like the officers in Alexander, the of
ficers were not engaged in any crime-solving activities when they
entered the defendant's home without a warrant.' 23
In Alexander, the court held that the standard for assessing
whether an officer's actions are justified by the community caretaking
exception is one of reasonableness. 24 The California Supreme Court
concluded that the officers in Ray met this standard. 25 According to
the court, because the officers reasonably believed that the defen-
dant's house might have been burglarized due to its appearance, and
did not enter to criminally investigate the defendant, the officers were
permitted to enter the dwelling to determine whether there was any-
one inside in need of assistance or property in need of protection. 126
b. The Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion did not discuss the community caretak-
ing exception in its analysis.' 2 7 Instead, Chief Justice George found
the search constitutional on the same ground as the court of ap-
peal.' 28 He argued that the officers' entry into the defendant's home
was justified by the exigent circumstances exception, since "the of-
ficers had reasonable cause to believe a burglary was in progress, or
that a burglary had been committed and there might be persons in-
side the residence in need of assistance."' 29
c. The Dissenting Opinion
The Ray opinion included a strong dissent from Justice Mosk,
who adamantly disagreed with the majority's endorsement of the com-
munity caretaking exception. 30 Justice Mosk stated that "[s]uch an
121. See id.
122. Id. at 277.
123. See Ray, 981 P.2d at 937.
124. See Alexander, 721 A.2d at 277.
125. See Ray, 981 P.2d at 938.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 940 (George, C.J., concurring).
128. See id. (George, C.J., concurring).
129. Id. (George, C.J., concurring).
130. See id. at 940-44 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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exception threatens to swallow the rule that absent a showing of true
necessity, the constitutionally guaranteed right to security and privacy
in one's home must prevail." 131 After discussing the history of the
Fourth Amendment and the protections traditionally afforded the
American public, 132 he emphasized that this type of situation is exactly
what the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect against.' 33 His
opinion also warned against the potential dangers lurking behind the
community caretaking exception, such as decreased protections guar-
anteed by the Fourth Amendment and an increased likelihood for po-
tential abuse by law enforcement agents.3 4
I1. Analysis: Ray-Opening the Door to Police Intrusion
A. Ray Conflicts with Previous Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Ray decision does not comport with previous Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, which has limited the application of the commu-
nity caretaking exception to warrantless searches of automobiles, not
private residences. 135 The California Supreme Court should have fol-
lowed precedent and refused to justify the warrantless search of a
home based on the community caretaking exception. 136
As the Seventh and Ninth Circuits previously recognized, the
community caretaking exception was meant to apply only to warrant-
less searches of automobiles, in part because automobiles are given
less protection against unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment. 13 7 In fact, the court in Pichany made it a point to note
that the community caretaking exception created by the United States
Supreme Court in Cady was not meant to be a broad exception "when-
ever the police are acting in an 'investigative,' rather than 'criminal'
function."'138 In so ruling, the Seventh Circuit refused to recognize
that the community caretaking exception applied to a warrantless
search of an individual's home. 3 9 So too did the Ninth Circuit in Er-
ickson reject the expansion of the exception beyond its limited applica-
131. Id. at 941 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 940-44 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 941-42 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 944 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
135. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973); United States v. Erickson, 991
F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 209 (7th Cir. 1982).
136. See Pichany, 687 F.2d at 209; Erickson, 991 F.2d at 532.
137. See Pichany, 687 F.2d at 209; Erickson, 991 F.2d at 532.
138. Pichany, 687 F.2d at 208-09.
139. See id. at 209.
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tion to automobiles. 140 Echoing the high Fourth Amendment
protections courts have traditionally afforded homes,1 41 the Erickson
court noted that there is a "'constitutional difference' between search-
ing a house and searching an automobile."'1 4 2 Thus, the community
caretaking exception should not apply to a warrantless search of a
home. 1
43
The California Supreme Court in Ray missed the crucial distinc-
tion between the home and automobile in terms of the constitutional
protections against warrantless searches. 44 The mere fact that police
are investigating a possible burglary or threat to public safety is not
enough to justify the erosion of the constitutional protections of the
home. 145 Simply put, the California Supreme Court should have
found that the sanctity of the home cannot be violated by a warrant-
less search short of exigent circumstances, limiting the community
caretaking exception to warrantless searches of automobiles.
B. Ray Creates a Potential for Abuse
The Ray decision could have a drastic effect on future Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by increasing the number of warrantless
searches of homes upheld under the community caretaking exception
in California and possibly elsewhere.
As the dissenting opinion in Ray stated, "[t] he potential for abuse
is obvious."'14 6 Ray has lowered the threshold for allowing law enforce-
ment officials to conduct warrantless searches of homes whenever
faced with a situation where a crime might have been committed. The
community caretaking exception gives police an exorbitant amount of
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of peoples' homes.
For example, in Ray, the neighbor who reported that the defen-
dant's door had been open all day, also said that he did not think
anyone was home, and that he could be contacted if necessary. 147
However, the officers did not attempt to further contact the neighbor,
nor did they attempt to contact any of the defendant's other neigh-
bors. 48 In addition, the officers failed to conduct a perimeter search
140. See Erickson, 991 F.2d at 532.
141. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
142. Erickson, 991 F.2d at 532 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973)).
143. See id.
144. See, e.g., id.
145. See United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208-09 (7th Cir. 1982).
146. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 944 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 931.
148. See id.
[Vol. 35
of his home in order to discern whether there was any additional evi-
dence to indicate that a burglary had indeed taken place.' 49 Instead,
the officers entered the residence based only on the neighbor's tele-
phone call and the appearance of defendant's living room.150 Even
assuming that a burglary had taken place, the probability that a crime
was still in progress was greatly diminished by the fact that the door
had been open all day long'
5 1
The police officers substituted probable cause with their own dis-
cretion and subverted the purpose behind the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement. 152 They based their decision to enter Ray's
home on what amounted to a hunch. They entered because the de-
fendant's door was open and the front room was "a mess."' 53 How-
ever, as indicated by the record, the trial court's reliance on the
room's "messy" appearance might have been misplaced. Although
one of the officers testified that the room appeared to be messy, "his
two contemporaneous reports ... did not include any such observa-
tion. A second officer testified that he did not notice a mess before
entering. The trial court implicitly found that the officers did not ob-
serve the condition of the house as they stood outside the door.'
54
The California Supreme Court should have deferred to the trial
court's findings and given less credence to the officers' testimony.
Under the community caretaking exception, the police are au-
thorized to enter homes only to protect the occupant's safety and wel-
fare.1 55 However, police have the power to abuse the community
caretaking exception by acting under the guise of concern for an indi-
vidual's welfare, when, in reality, their true motivation may be to seek
and find incriminating evidence with which to prosecute that individ-
ual. Ironically, police involvement based on the community caretaking
exception may indirectly lead to the prosecution of the very people
the police were initially seeking to protect.
C. Flaws in Ray
The majority opinion focused its analysis primarily on two previ-
ous decisions-Roberts and Alexander. The majority used the facts of
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 941 n.1 (Mosk., J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 934.
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both cases and the application of the community caretaking excep-
tion in those instances to justify the application of the exception to
the facts of Ray.' 56 However, the Roberts and Alexander opinions illus-
trate the inherent problems that can arise when applying the commu-
nity caretaking exception in the context of warrantless entries into
private residences.
The facts of Roberts illustrate the likelihood for abuse of discretion
by police officers when performing warrantless searches based on the
community caretaking exception. In Roberts, the officers claimed that
because they heard "moans and groans" emanating from the defen-
dant's home, they were therefore justified in making a warrantless en-
try. 157 However, upon entry they discovered that no one was in fact
inside the residence. 158 The court nevertheless justified the officers'
actions under the community caretaking exception, allowing the de-
fendant to be prosecuted for evidence seized pursuant to the initial
warrantless entry. 159
The problem with applying the exception to the circumstances
like those described in Roberts is that it gives police officers the ability
to enter a private residence without a warrant simply by claiming that
they heard "moans or groans" coming from the interior of the resi-
dence. The potential for abuse under such circumstances is abundant,
as officers investigating possible crimes will be tempted to enter a resi-
dence without a warrant, and to later justify their actions solely by
claiming that they heard noises coming from inside the residence.
The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is intended to curb
the potential for abuses of discretion by police officers, and the com-
munity caretaking exception will likely defeat this critical purpose
when applied in the context of a private residence.
The Alexander court set the standard of review for application of
the community caretaking exception as one of reasonableness.1 60 In
Alexander, as in Ray, the defendant's door was open and the officers
did not receive a response from the interior of the residence. 161 Based
on such facts, the officers in both cases decided to make warrantless
entries into the defendants' homes. 162 In both cases, the courts viewed
the officers' actions as reasonable, and therefore justified by the com-
156. See id. at 935-37.
157. See People v. Roberts, 303 P.2d 721, 722 (Cal. 1956).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See State v. Alexander, 721 A.2d 275, 277 n.124 (Md. 1998).
161. See id. at 277-78.
162. See Roberts, 303 P.2d at 722; Alexander, 721 A.2d at 275.
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munity caretaking exception. 163 However, the reasonableness stan-
dard sets too low a threshold for application of the community
caretaking exception.
The court in Alexander suggested that "because the police were
not looking for any evidence of a crime, they needed no suspicion at
all to 'search."' 1 64 This standard permits officers to enter a private
residence whenever a door is left open and the officers receive no
response from inside the residence. The privacy that individuals once
enjoyed in their own homes will be defeated by a standard that per-
mits officers to make warrantless entries based on such a paucity of
facts. Such an innocuous observation should not give officers the right
to make a warrantless entry and subsequently prosecute the owner for
evidence found inside the residence. If officers are permitted to make
such entries, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, and the protec-
tion that it affords, will be severely diminished.
D. Artificial Devices and Artificial Concern
In Silverman v. United States,165 the United States Supreme Court
reviewed a decision admitting into evidence contents of conversations
that took place in the defendant's home, which were overheard by
police officers by means of an electronic listening device. 166 The
Court emphasized the protection the Fourth Amendment provides in-
dividuals while in their homes.167 The majority opinion, written byJus-
tice Stewart, stated: "This Court has never held that a federal officer
may without warrant and without consent physically entrench into a
man's office or home, there secretly observe or listen, and relate at
the man's subsequent criminal trial what was seen or heard."' 68
While the particular facts of Silverman and Ray are dissimilar, the
underlying circumstance involved in both cases is the same-an un-
reasonable intrusion by law enforcement into an individual's private
residence. While Silverman prevents the police from using listening de-
vices to ferret out criminal activity, 169 the same principle should also
prevent the police from snooping around an individual's home
(where they may already suspect criminal activity) or waiting for a
163. See Roberts, 303 P.2d at 722; Alexander, 721 A.2d at 280.
164. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1999) (citing Alexander, 721 A.2d at
277-80).
165. 365 U.S. 505 (1960).
166. See id. at 506.
167. See id. at 511.
168. Id. at 511-12.
169. See id.
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door to be left open in order to justify their immediate entry into the
residence without a warrant.
The private domain is afforded expansive protection which is not
to be invaded by artificial listening devices; neither should it be in-
vaded by a police officer's artificial concern for a dwelling's inhabi-
tant. Individuals should not have to worry that leaving their doors
open and their living rooms "messy" will grant a police officer the
right to enter their homes and conduct a random inspection. This
unbridled discretion will not only diminish the level of privacy individ-
uals once enjoyed in their homes, but ironically, it will also foster com-
munity distrust of law enforcement officials empowered under the
very community caretaking exception meant to protect them.
E. Warrantless Limbo: How Low Can You Go?
The Ray majority should not have validated the police conduct in
this instance under either the community caretaking or the exigent
circumstances exception. At the very least, the court should have con-
strained its analysis to the exigent circumstances exception given pre-
vious Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the particular facts of
the case. The exigent circumstances exception was clearly defined in
the case of People v. Dumas,170 where the California Supreme Court
stated:
The courts have implicitly recognized that man requires some
sanctuary in which his freedom to escape the intrusions of society
is all but absolute. Such places have been held inviolate from war-
rantless search except in emergencies of overriding magnitude,
such as pursuit of a fleeing felon or the necessity of action for the
preservation of life or property.'71
In Ray, the facts available to the officers at the time they entered
the defendant's dwelling did not warrant a belief that an "emergency
of overriding magnitude" was at hand. The officers knew that the
door had been open all day long, but did not even attempt to contact
the person who reported the incident. For all the police officers knew,
the anonymous caller could have been a disgruntled neighbor who
just wanted to harass his neighbor. There was no indication that some-
one inside needed help or that a crime was in progress.' 7 2 Instead, the
police entered the home without any readily apparent emergency and
170. 512 P.2d 1208 (Cal. 1973).
171. Id. at 1215-16 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); People v. Sirhan,
497 P.2d 1121, 1137-42 (Cal. 1972); People v. Roberts, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (Cal. 1956)).
172. See People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 941 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("There was
no evidence of a forced entry; an expensive-looking television and stereo situated near the
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discovered contraband that was subsequently used to prosecute the
defendant.
The community caretaking exception sets no boundaries.
[It] has obscured the firm line at the entrance to the house that
the Fourth Amendment has drawn. Does the lead opinion's new
exception also permit entry when a door is unlocked? When a
neighbor reports that no one is home, or the occupants simply
choose not to answer a knock at the door? When something "might
be" wrong?173
It now appears permissible under the community caretaking ex-
ception for officers to make a warrantless entry into a private resi-
dence even if the front door is closed and perhaps either a window or
garage door is open. If an officer were to come upon an open window
or garage, would he or she be justified in taking a look inside? In
making a warrantless entry? The protection historically afforded pri-
vate residences is greatly decreased by an exception which permits
such unbridled discretion on the part of police officers. Consequently,
the home will no longer be viewed as a sanctuary where an individual
can be free from governmental intrusions.
The exigent circumstances and emergency aid exceptions already
provide officers with the ability to make warrantless entries into pri-
vate residences when the circumstances permit such entries. Officers
should not be allowed to use the newly adopted community caretak-
ing exception to justify the remainder of warrantless entries that are
not permitted under either of these exceptions. Officers should be
limited to those exceptions already carefully delineated for warrant-
less entries into private residences, keeping the protection afforded by
the Fourth Amendment intact.
F. Tamborino v. Superior Court and Ray: A Case of Apples
and Oranges
In Tamborino v. Superior Court,1 7 4 the California Supreme Court
reviewed a decision permitting the introduction of evidence that was
seized after an initial warrantless entry by police officers into a private
residence.175 The search and seizure were justified on the basis of an
abundance of facts amounting to exigent circumstances. 176 The police
front door did not appear to have been disturbed. Nor was there any indication that any-
one was inside....").
173. Id. at 944 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
174. 719 P.2d 242 (Cal. 1986).
175. See id. at 243.
176. See id.
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had received a report of a robbery at a location where a victim was
believed to be injured or bleeding, and they observed bloodstains
outside the building and on the walkway to the defendant's apart-
ment. 77 The officers then knocked on the defendant's door and
identified themselves, but they did not receive a response.178 The of-
ficers entered only after hearing movement from inside the apart-
ment. 179 Once the door was open, they saw the defendant bleeding
inside and, not knowing if there were any other victims inside the
home, performed a protective sweep.18 o During the protective sweep,
the officers discovered contraband inside the apartment.' 8 ' The de-
fendant sought to have the contraband suppressed. 182
The California Supreme Court held that the exigency of the cir-
cumstances justified the officers' warrantless entry into the apartment,
stating: "Under the particular facts of the present case, we conclude
that the discovery of one wounded victim afforded reasonable cause to
enter and briefly search for additional victims." 1 8 3 The totality of the
circumstances, indicating that a violent crime may have occurred on
the premises, vindicated the officers in making a warrantless entry and
seizing contraband that was in plain sight. 184
In Tamborino, there was abundance of clear and articulable facts
justifying the officers' actions. In contrast, the facts of Ray were grossly
insufficient and did not offer such a clear indication of an emergency
situation where immediate warrantless entry into a residence was nec-
essary. Again, in Ray, the officers' decision to enter the residence was
based solely on the neighbor's phone call, an open door, and possibly a
messy living room.1 85 The officers did not see or hear any signs of
distress coming from the interior of the residence. There was no sign
of any occupants and there was nothing to indicate a crime had taken
place, or that someone was injured or in need of emergency assis-
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 243-44. A protective sweep allows the police to do a limited search of the
premises if there is a reasonable likelihood that other victims may be found in the home.
See id.
181. See id. at 244.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 245.
184. See id. at 245-46.
185. See People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 941 n.I (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (noting
that "[t] he superior court implicitly found that the officers did not observe the condition of
the house as they stood outside the door").
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tance. 18 6 Based on such facts, the officers were not justified in enter-
ing the residence under the exigent circumstances exception.
G. Look Before You Leap: The Consequences of Ray
Because the Ray majority could not justify the officers' actions
under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant require-
ment, they were compelled to adopt a broad new exception. 87 How-
ever, in the court's hasty desire to admit the evidence against the
defendant, its willingness to accept the community caretaking excep-
tion as the basis for its decision undercuts Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence protecting individuals from unreasonable governmental
intrusions and ensuring that police do not exert unbridled discretion.
Indeed, neither the defendant nor the Attorney General in Ray
briefed or argued before the California Supreme Court about the ap-
plicability of the community caretaking exception.' 88
The Ray decision is likely to have a drastic effect on the delicate
balance struck by the many decisions weighing law enforcement's
right to conduct effective investigations against an individual's right to
be secure in his or her own home. If the California Supreme Court
wanted to create a new exception to the warrant requirement, it
should have included an explanation of how the exception is to func-
tion and under what circumstances law enforcement agents may be
justified in using it to explain their conduct. The Ray opinion does
not include any such examination or guidance, leaving this area of law
ambiguous and open to significant interpretation. Unfortunately, ap-
plication of the community caretaking exception is likely to be done
by law enforcement officials on an ad hoc basis at the expense of the
American public.
It should be noted that this Note does not suggest that officers
should never be able to enter a home in order to check on the safety
of the occupants and property therein. Rather, when police enter an
individual's private residence without a warrant and cannot justify
their actions on the basis of exigent circumstances, they should be
prohibited from using any evidence that is taken from the interior of
the residence in a subsequent prosecution. The officers should not be
186. See id. at 941 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 932.
188. See id. at 932-33 (explaining that the trial court and the court of appeal analyzed
the facts and law under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment
requirement, and that only on review did the Attorney General even urge the California
Supreme Court to affirm the court of appeal on the basis of the emergency aid exception).
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able to use the community caretaking exception to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment protection of homes; such exception should only
be applied to automobiles based on their unique, transitory nature. 189
Conclusion
The community caretaking exception applied in Ray runs afoul
of precedent because it allows for a warrantless entry into a private
home absent exigent circumstances. This exception represents a ma-
jor departure from the many cases decided in light of the Payton deci-
sion all but prohibiting warrantless searches of private homes.190 The
Ray court simply chose to ignore precedent, a decision which will
likely have a drastic effect on the many cases that will come before the
California courts challenging warrantless entries into private homes
and subsequent prosecutions for evidence discovered within.
In Ray, there was no imminent threat to the occupants of the
household and, consequently, there was no reason for the police to
enter the residence without a warrant. If the California Supreme
Court is willing to authorize such actions by police, the protection af-
forded by the Fourth Amendment will cease to exist. As the dissenting
opinion noted, "[u]nder the lead opinion's newly created exception,
entry is permissible, and incriminating evidence can be seized, when
police officers enter a home merely to 'find out what's going on." 91
Individuals can no longer feel as if their homes are safe from the
watchful eye of the police who might come upon their open door and
enter uninvited, merely because they suspect that an occupant needs
assistance or whatever other reasonable, non-criminal justification the
police can posit. The community caretaking exception adopted by the
California Supreme Court in Ray should be reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court for a final determination that such an excep-
tion defeats the central purpose of the warrant requirement and
should therefore be discarded.
189. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-89 (1980); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 442 (1973); United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 209 (7th Cir. 1982).
190. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
191. Ray, 981 P.2d at 944 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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